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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
interest in the preservation of the deterrent effect of the sure and certain, as
well as expeditious and orderly, administration of criminal justice. It has been
said that "Justice is not a one-way street-that law-abiding citizens .and lawabiding communities are entitled, at least equally with criminals, to the pro1
tection of the law."'
J. P.M.
IMANSLAUGHTER THE SAME IN NEW YORK AND NORTH CAROLINA FOR PURPOSE
OF HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE

After defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree, the
State filed an information at the time of sentencing which charged him as a
second felony offender. Previously, the defendant had been convicted of common law manslaughter in North Carolina. On the basis of these convictions,
defendant was sentenced under Penal Law section 1941 and received an
indeterminate term of twenty to forty years. After serving six years of that
term, defendant commenced this coram nobis proceeding on the ground that
the North Carolina conviction was not one which could form the basis of a
conviction under the New York habitual criminal statute.' Special Term denied
the application, and this decision was unanimously affirmed by the Appellate
Division.2 Held, affirmed, two justices dissenting. Though manslaughter in
North Carolina is a common law rather than a statutory crime, it is defined
as "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice and without premeditation,"3 which amounts to the same prohibition as under section 1049
of the Penal Law, and therefore, the North Carolina crime is a valid predicate
for second felony sentencing in this state. People v. Perkins, 11 N.Y.2d 195,
182 N.E.2d 274, 227 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1962).
Section 1941 subdivision 1 of the Penal Law states:
a person, who, after having been once or twice convicted within
this state, of a felony, of an attempt to commit a felony, or, under
the laws of any other state, . . . of a crime which, if committed within
this state, would be a felony, commits any felony, within this state,
is punishable upon a second or third offense, as follows:
If the second or third felony is such that, upon a first conviction, the
offender would be punishable by imprisonment for any term less than
victed criminal who escapes sentencing on the basis of the rule laid down in the instant
case. The record shows (supra note 1) that since April 9, 1953, when the Bronx County
Court failed to sentence him he has been incarcerated almost continuously. His career in
crime includes charges of assault, rape, robbery, felonious assault upon a police officer,
possession of burglary tools, as well as parole and probation violations. If the delayed sentencing of the relator in the instant case has worked an injustice, it does not readily present
itself upon a close reading of the record.
17. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 514, 137 A.2d 472, 483 (1958) (dissenting
opinion).
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 1941.
2. People v. Perkins, 13 A.D.2d 998, 216 N.Y.S.2d 762 (2d Dep't 1961).
3. State v. Benson, 183 N.C. 795, 799, 11 S.E. 869, 871 (1922).
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his natural life, then such person must be sentenced to imprisonment
for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be not less
than one-half of the longest term prescribed upon a first conviction,
and the maximum of which shall be not longer than twice such longest
term.
This section has been upheld as constitutional. 4 The fact that it imposes heavier
penalties on second and third offenders by no means places a second punishment on the first offense but merely increases the punishment for the latest
conviction. 5 If the prior conviction is from another jurisdiction, the conviction
6
must be of a crime which if committed in New York would be a felony.
In order for the prior conviction in a foreign jurisdiction to serve as the
basis for sentencing under the habitual criminal statute in New York, the
minimum statutory limit defining the crime in that foreign jurisdiction as a
felony must define a crime which is a felony in New York; in other words, the
minimum requirement for a felony in a foreign jurisdiction must be at least
7
the same or greater than the New York requirement. In People v. Olah, the
defendant had previously been convicted of larceny, a felony. The minimum
statutory limit in New Jersey for such a felony was $20; the corresponding
New York limit was $100. It was held that the defendant, who had stolen
property valued at $200, had not committed such a crime which if committed
in New York would be a felony; therefore, he could not be sentenced as a
second felony offender. It is the statute in the foreign jurisdiction, not the
indictment charging the specific acts, which defines the crime. If the foreign
indictment charging a crime specifies acts which more than meet the minimal
requirements for that state's statute, the courts in New York will refrain from
considering the surplusage contained in that indictment. Thus, in Olah the
amount in excess of $20 ($180) was surplusage and not considered by the court
because all that was material was that defendant stole $20. Olah is in "accord
with the generally accepted judicial feeling that the length of a defendant's
sentence should be within the discretionary power of the trial judge instead
' 8
of subject to the legislative mandate of the recidivist law. That decision also
recognizes the possibility that a defendant, who realizes that he has undoubtedly violated the criminal standard in the foreign state, might not, at trial
in that state, defend himself on the issue of the extent of his criminal act,
never anticipating that his conviction may serve as the basis of a second
felony offense under the habitual criminal statute. For example, the defendant
in Olak, knowing that he had stolen more than $20 and, thus was guilty of a
felony, may have reasoned that it was useless to argue that he had stolen less
than $100 (an amount which was only a misdemeanor in New York).
4. People ex rel. Fernandez v. Kaiser, 230 App. Div. 646, 246 N.Y. Supp. 309 (3d
Dep't 1930).

5. People v. La Sasso, 182 Misc. 538, 44 N.Y.S.2d 93 (County Ct. 1943).
6. People v. Olah, 300 N.Y. 96, 89 N.E.2d 329 (1949).

7. Ibid.
8. 50 Colum. L. Rev. 247,

250 (1950).
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In the instant case, the defendant claimed that he could have raised the
defense, coming to the aid of others, on a manslaughter charge in New York,
whereas he was not allowed this defense in North Carolina. Though he had not
pleaded such a defense in North Carolina, he contended that there was a
variance between the definition of manslaughter in the two states, i.e., they
were different crimes. The Court held that where the only difference between
the law of New York and that of the foreign jurisdiction is one of defense,
the prior conviction in the foreign jurisdiction is a conviction "of a crime
which, if committed within this state, would be a felony .. . ," and, therefore,
can serve as the basis for the sentencing under section 1941 of the Penal
Law. The dissent objected that manslaughter in New York and manslaughter
in North Carolina are different crimes by virtue of the availability of a defense
in New York not available in North Carolina, and it is immaterial whether
defendant actually did kill in the defense of another.
Obviously, section 1941 of the Penal Law acts as a deterrent to criminals.
However, the principal legislative intent was to make certain that those who
have shown themselves unable to live in society (habitual criminals) should
be removed from society by lengthy prison terms. It is not reasonable to assume
that the Legislature intended that merely because a defendant was previously
convicted in a foreign jurisdiction of a crime denoted as a felony in that
jurisdiction that the conviction should serve as the basis for second felony
sentencing without regard to the acts which the defendant actually committed.
If the defendant is to be sentenced in New York under a New York statute,
a New York standard noting which crimes constitute felonies should be applicable. For example, if the defendant in the Olah case had stolen over $20
(a felony in New Jersey) and under $100 (a misdemeanor in New York), it
would be unjust to consider this as a second or third felony in New York.
The court in Olak went far beyond this construction and indicated that, no
matter how great the amount stolen, a conviction under the New Jersey larceny
statute could not serve as the basis of a second felony sentencing. This decision
was not in accord with the legislative intent apparent in Section 1941. It may
be that there were excellent policy reasons for the Olah decision. Penological
studies have indicated that habitual criminal statutes are only retributive, and
in no way aid the reformation of prisoners. However, even in this light, there
are two possible criticisms of the Olah decision. First, if the Legislature enacted
section 1941 of the Penal Law with an obvious purpose, the Court should not
have emasculated that purpose. 9 Second, even if the language of the statute
was unclear and construction by the Court was necessary, the Court should
9.

25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 653, 655: "It would seem that the legislative intent to punish

more severely those who have previously been convicted of acts which in New York would
be a felony is not being carried out and hardened criminals with past convictions will
receive lighter sentences on a mere technicality of law"; 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1448: "[Tlhe
effect of the present construction is to deprive the public of much of the protection that
habitual offender laws have intended to give."

144
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have stated the true basis for its decision, namely, the policy considerations,
and should not have clouded the area with illogical semantics. The problems
caused by such a decision can easily be discerned in the instant case. Here,
Olak was not overruled but in fact was relied on by the majority. The Court
declared that the crimes were identical in both states and only the defenses
to that crime differed. If Olah is to be followed, this distinction. is invalid. As
the dissent stated, "these differences support [defendant's] . . . conclusion
that he could have been convicted in North Carolina of acts which would not
support a conviction in this state."' 0 That principle was apparently vital in
the Olalh decision. The Court of Appeals in Olak and in the instant case has used
questionable reasoning in arriving at its decision. The former case appears to
be diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of section 1941; the latter
case, an exception to Olah, is in accord with the legislative intent of this
habitual criminal statute.
Bd.
OPINION OF DEFENDANT'S SANITY BASED ON DIRECT OBSERVATION
HAVE

BEEN

ALLOWED

ALTHOUGH

PRECEDED

BY

HYPOTHETICAL

SHOULD

QUESTION

Defendant was indicted for murder in the first degree; his sole defense
was predicated on the theory of insanity. In support of defendant's contentions,
his expert witness testified that psychiatric examinations on three occasions
before trial revealed that defendant had a syphillitic condition resulting in
brain damage and had a medical record of two head injuries resulting in
unconsciousness at the time of each injury. Following this testimony, the doctor
was asked the hypothetical of whether a person having a similar history, who
on the night of the killing consumed a considerable quantity of liquor, would
be laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature and
quality of his act or that such act was wrong. The doctor characterized such
a person as one "suffering with pathological intoxication" and "insane." Defense
counsel then asked him if it was his testimony that the defendant was insane
at the time of commission of the act. The answer, however, was precluded by an
objection which was sustained, but the court later asked this question of a
medical expert for the prosecution, who had made an examination of defendant
before trial to determine defendant's capability of understanding the charge,
and he answered that the defendant was not insane at the time of his act. The
district attorney, in his closing argument, implied to the jury that since the
prosecution witness testified to actual experience and defense counsel merely
to insanity based on the hypothetical, the prosecution witness' testimony was
entitled to more weight. Defendant appealed from his conviction, and the
Court of Appeals, two judges dissenting, reversed and ordered a new trial.
Held: failure to allow the defense witness to testify as to his opinion based on
10. People v. Perkins, 11 N.Y.2d 195, 197, 182 N.E.2d 274, 276, 227 N.Y.S.2d 663,
665 (1962).

